Agent coalition is an important manner of agents' coordination and cooperation. Forming a coalition, agents can enhance their ability to solve problems and obtain more utility. In this paper, a novel multi-task coalition parallel formation strategy is presented, and the conclusion that the process of multi-task coalition formation is a Markov Decision Process is testified theoretically. Moreover, reinforcement learning is used to solve agents' behavior strategy, and the process of multi-task coalition parallel formation is described. In multi-task oriented domains, the strategy can effectively and parallel reach multi-task coalitions.
Introduction
In several applications, an agent may not efficiently perform a task by himself, thus agents have to form a coalition in order to execute the task and obtain some rewards. Since "coalition" first was put forward in 1993, coalition formation has been a key problem and widely studied in the research of multi-agent system (MAS) [1 ∼ 4] .
Several woks have investigated the coalition formation problem based on the n-person cooperation game theory, which mainly deals with the coalition's utility distribution among agents according to their preference to reach a global optimal coalition [1, 3, 5, 6] . But these researches relax the coalition formation algorithms, emphasize the equity of utility allocation, and ignores the difference of agents' action during coalition formation, which leads to a coalition's instability because although the total utility of the coalition increases, the utility of its members may decrease much.
Luo [7] proposed a non-reducing utility allocation strategy that can encourage agents to enlarge a coalition to obtain more total utility and personal utility. Their strategy is simple and timely. But they don't distinguish the difference of agents' contribution to a coalition by allocating utility averagely. And the designed "contract rule" diminishes other agents' interest to join in the existing coalition, and affects the formation of the global optimal coalition.
Jiang [8] proposed a coalition formation strategy based on capability vector contribution-rate and auction that can partly realize the thinking of distribution according to work. But they don't give concretely the amount of capabilities that agents contribute to a coalition in course of problem-solving and their strategy is easy to run into coalition lock. Furthermore, they allocate additional utility on auction without distinguishing the contribution of new agents that have brought certain added utility to the existing coalition, and their auction needs agents to interact with each other ceaselessly, producing a large amount of communication spending.
Shehory [9] developed a protocol that enables agents to negotiate and form coalitions, and provide them with simple heuristics for choosing coalition partners. But when two or more qualified coalitions submitted their proposals simultaneously, the proposed method can't reach the global optimal coalition. Especially, all agents originate proposals simultaneously, the system will run into coalition lock. Moreover, the negotiation strategy that an agent only one turn in each round decreases the probability of form optimal coalition.
All these previous works deal with the payoff distribution and negotiation strategy, and do not take into account agents' behavior strategy. In [10] , their strategy can formalize the subtask selection using a Markov Decision Process, but in their environment agents can't control perfectly the consumption of their resource, and the auction approach only can form a coalition for a task serially, and can't be used in parallel multi-task oriented domains.
In this paper, a multi-task coalition parallel formation strategy is proposed. We will propose a novel multi-task coalition parallel formation strategy, and design agent behavior strategy based on reinforcement learning. Our example illustrates that the proposed strategy can effectively and parallel reach multi-task coalitions in multi-task oriented domains.
Problem formulation
The problem of multi-task coalition parallel formation can be described as follows: 1) Task: Given a finite set of tasks
For executing the task T i , agents can obtain the utility P (T i ). 2) Agent: We consider situations where a set of m rational bounded-resource agents, Agent = {1, 2, · · · , m}, have to cooperate to execute the tasks We assume that the agents are rational [4, 11] and each agent tries to maximize its utility. Among all the possible behavior strategies that an agent has, it will choose the one that will lead to its maximum utility. Besides, agents are self-interested, and an agent can reduce its own cost paid out for a task by cooperating with other agents and obtain certain additional utility. So an agent is willing to form a coalition with other agents to increase its own utility.
3) Coalition: a coalition Ξ T i for task T i is a tuple
where F (C T i ) represents the cost of all members' capability, and ϕ(
The members in C T i commonly share the utility V (C T i ), and their payoff distribution vector is
) ), and
alloc T i is a task allocation function that associates with each dimensional capability b
controller is used to determine the optimal coalition for each task and allocate utility for each agent in multi-task coalitions.
The problem of the multi-task coalition parallel formation is that N coalitions must be effectively formed parallel according to N tasks in
with the purpose of maximizing the utility of each agent in system coalitions. Let R(s, a, s ) denote the immediate reward after transition from state s to s executing action a, and P (s, a, s ) denote the state transition probability from state s to s executing action a.
The essence of MDP is that the effects of an action taken in a state depend only on that state and not on the prior history.
In order to maximize their individual benefits with their available resources and capabilities, the self-interested agents seek each to form coalitions rationally. In other words, the process of multi-task coalition parallel formation is a decision process that each agent selects tasks to execute.
Definition 2. agents state S is defined as a state vector of all agents in the system, and presented by (s1, s2, · · · , sm) where: Definition 3. the set of agent action is denoted as Action = {J, K}.
In order to obtain the maximum utility, many agents may be inclined to execute the same tasks, so there may be a collision among agents. To reduce the collision, agent k needs to exchange states to know about other agents' residual capability, and decides its state transition probability P (s i,k , a, s i+1,k ) , thus agent k will be picked in a bigger probability by the Controller to join the task final coalition and obtain its maximum utility. But due to its self-interest, each agent does not want other agents to know its residual capability orienting task T i , and only exchange whether its residual capabilities can perform task T i with other agents. So agents' residual capabilities must be first binarized and the binarization results is defined as Duration Vector.
Definition 4. Duration Vector of agent k is defined as Dur
Agent k exchanges its Duration Vector with other agents by blackboard method, and decides its state transition probability P (s i,k , a, s i+1,k ) as (7).
0, otherwise (7) Therefor,the system's state transition probability P (Si, a, Si+1) is as follows.
Orienting task T i , the selection of action a(J or K ) drives the agent into a new state Si+1 from state Si which is shown as (9), (10), (11) and (12) .
where j = 1, 2, · · · , r. Furthermore, orienting a new task, agent k updates its Duration Vector Dur i+1,k on the basis of its residual capabilities according to (6) . Claim 1. the process of multi-task coalition parallel formation is a MDP.
Proof: According to the properties of Markov Decision Process, here we only need to prove the process constructed by Si = (si,1, si,2, · · · , si,m)(i ≥ 0) of agent task selection is a Markov Decision Process.
According to Definition 1, we only need to prove state Si+1 only depends on Si. Note that at time i + 1, the system state transition probability P (Si, a, Si+1) is determined only by agents available capabilities at time i as (7) and (8) . Furthermore, the state Si+1 only depends on Si as (9), (10), (11) and (12) . So, this process is a Markov Decision Process.
Agent behavior strategy based on reinforcement learning
Reinforcement learning [12, 13, 14] is a method which maps environment states to actions,and obtains optimal policy through trial-and-error and interaction with dynamic environment. In the problem of the multi-task coalition parallel formation, the long-term influences of agent behavior should be considered. So Definition 5 will define state value as objective function to decide the optimal actions.
Definition 5. state value ν(s k ) of agent k is defined as the sum of last payoff in the tasks which have been allocated to agent k before it reaches state s k .
Definition 6. immediate reward r(s k ) of agent k is defined as the reward obtained after action a has been taken and driven agent k to state s k from state s k . For example, if agent k takes action J to execute the jth dimensional capability of task T i+1 , it will obtain the reward
Being in state S, each agent has to select an action to maximize its long-term reward. A behavior strategy π k is a mapping from state to actions, and the state value s k is as follows where γ is discount factor.
The theory of dynamic programming can guarantee at least an optimal strategy π k * for an agent to obtain maximum utility, as shown in (14) .
The basic learning steps are as follows: 1) initialization: i = 0, for each S ∈ SS, a k ∈ Action, k = 1, 2, · · · , m, make υ(s i,k ) = 0 and initialize state S0;
2) Loop: for k = 1, 2, · · · , m, agent k chooses action a k i according to its state transition probability P (s i,k , a, s i+1,k ) , observes r(s i+1,k ) and s i+1,k , and updates υ π k (s i,k ) as (13) and (14) . i = i + 1.
Process of multi-task coalition parallel formation
The process of multi-task coalition parallel formation can be described as follows: 1) each agent decides the set of tasks to execute and the contributive capabilities according to each task through reinforcement learning;
2) each agent submit its final state sopt =< RAopt, T Aopt > to the system, and the controller decides the final coalitions for tasks according to (15) satisfying that the residual capabilities of all agents in coalitions is least, and the utilization factor of agent capability is maximal;
3) The payoff of each agent is allocated according to (4) and (5) . We will take agent 3 for an example to illustrate agent behavior strategy and the process of multi-task coalition parallel formation. defined by (10), (11) and (12) As υ(s1,31) > υ(s1,32) > υ(s1,33), agent 3 transits to state s1,31 in the probability of P (s0,3, J, s1,31) = 0.17, and s1,3 = s1,31, P (s0,3, J, s1,3) = P (s0,3, J, s1,31) = 0.17, ν(s1,3) = 3.
3) we can obtained the results as follows by the same methods:
(a) when i = 2, that is agent 3 orients the 2nd dimensional capability of each task, agent 3 transits to state s2,3
in the state transition probability of P (s1,3, J, s2,3) = 0.1, and the value of state s2,3 is ν(s2,3) = 8; (b) when i = 3, agent 3 orients the 3rd dimensional capability of each task, agent 3 transits to state s3,3 = (0, 0, 1),
in the state transition probability of P (s2,3, J, s3,3) = 0.11, and the value of state s3,3 is ν(s3,3) = 15;
The main states and the state value of agent 3 is shown in Table 1. 4) each agent submits its final state to the system. The possible coalitions for task T 1 are {3, 4, 7}, {3, 4, 9}, {8, 4, 7} and {8, 4, 9}. The possible coalitions for task T 2 is {2, 3, 1}. The possible coalitions for task T 3 are {5, 6, 3} and {7, 6, 3}. 5) the controller decides the final coalitions for tasks according to (15) (see in Table 2 ).
6) the utility of each agent is obtained according to (4) and (5) (see in Table 3 ). Table 2 The task-oriented coalitions As can be seen, the strategy in this paper can effectively and parallel form optimal coalitions for multi-task, avoid coalition lock and resource conflict, adequately consider agent behavior when maximizing system's utility, and satisfy each agent's need. Moreover, the payoff distribution accords to work, and ascertains coalition stability and tasks solving efficiency.
Conclusion
In this paper, we consider situations where multiple tasks should be performed parallel by group of agents, and a multi-task coalition parallel formation strategy is proposed. Firstly, the conclusion is testified theoretically that the process of multi-task coalition formation is a Markov Decision Process. Secondly, reinforcement learning is used to solve agents' behavior strategy, and the process of coalitions formation is given. Finally, an example is shown to illuminate that the strategy can effectively and parallel reach multitask coalitions in multi-task oriented domains.
